How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?
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- 3 November 2011
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 43 (1) , 1-35
Abstract
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This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
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