The Behaviour of Declining Industries
Author:
- 1 September 1998
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 74 (226) , 217-230
Abstract
This paper examines how the prospect of imminent exit by a competitor in a declining industry affects the market behaviour of that industry prior to exit. We show that ‘survivor’ firms have an incentive to increase their holdings of inventories and to hold excess capacity before exit occurs. Preparation for the failure of a rival will also involve increasing output. This will push down the market price and may hasten the rival firm's demise. The welfare consequences of these actions are mixed but can be very different from the same actins in a growing or stable industry. In particular, holding excess capacity or increased inventories may be procompetitive.Keywords
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