Search and Trading in Intermediated Markets
Author:
- 1 June 1996
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 5 (2) , 195-216
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of a middleman on the search and trading behavior of the traders. It is shown that the buyer and seller types with middle valuations choose to search for each other, while the buyer and seller types with high or low valuations drop out of the search market and choose to trade directly with the middleman. The ask and bid prices of the middleman act as an outside option for the buyer and seller, and influence the outcome of the bargaining between the two. The model generalizes Gehrig (1993) by endogenizing the traders' search intensities, by allowing the traders to go to an intermediary even if thy have engaged in search, and by enabling the intermediary to provide the service of immediacy.Keywords
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- Intermediation in Search MarketsJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1993
- In search of the right middlemanEconomics Letters, 1993
- Middlemen as ExpertsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1993
- Adverse Selection and the MiddlemanEconomica, 1989
- The Persistence and Indeterminacy of Unemployment in Search EquilibriumThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1989
- Information Costs, Intermediation and Equilibrium PriceEconomica, 1985
- Aggregate Demand Management in Search EquilibriumJournal of Political Economy, 1982
- Transaction Costs, Order Placement Strategy, and Existence of the Bid-Ask SpreadJournal of Political Economy, 1981
- Optimal dealer pricing under transactions and return uncertaintyJournal of Financial Economics, 1981
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining ProblemEconometrica, 1975