Aggregative Public Good Games
- 27 March 2007
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 9 (2) , 201-219
Abstract
We exploit the aggregative structure of the public good model to provide a simple analysis of the voluntary contribution game. In contrast to the best response function approach, ours avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is increased, and can readily analyze games involving many heterogeneous players. We demonstrate the approach at work on the standard pure public good model and show how it can analyze extensions of the basic model.Keywords
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