Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
Authors:
- Masaki AoyagiMAMasaki Aoyagi
- Guillaume FréchetteGFGuillaume Fréchette
- 1 May 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 144 (3) , 1135-1165
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
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