Why voters vote for incumbents but against incumbency: A rational choice explanation
Authors:
- 1 May 1995
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 57 (1) , 67-83
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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