The Economics of Standards Wars
Author:
- 1 January 2004
- journal article
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Network Economics
- Vol. 3 (1)
Abstract
Policymakers face an increasing number of questions regarding whether markets efficiently choose technological standards. In this essay I survey the economic literature regarding standards, focusing on arguments that markets move between standards either too slowly or too swiftly.Keywords
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