Multi‐level party favoritism: The case of a discretionary grant program in Poland
- 24 September 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Swiss Political Science Review
- Vol. 31 (2) , 331-364
Abstract
Party favoritism in the distribution of grants is a well‐known mechanism fueling pork‐barrel politics and clientelism. In this paper, we analyze partisan bias in the distribution of the Polish Government Fund for Local Investments (RFIL) and demonstrate implications of party favoritism for the re‐centralization strategy adopted by the right‐wing populist government. We find robust evidence for a substantial bias that favors municipal authorities aligned with the national government. The proportion of the municipalities receiving any funding in two analyzed waves of the RFIL program increased by more than 45 percentage points and the amount of funding granted by more than 175 PLN per capita as a result of electing a mayor affiliated with the ruling party. We demonstrate that the partisan bias also affects municipalities ruled by local independents. It proliferates party polarization from the national level to the local politics and, in the longer run, may lead to its greater nationalization.Keywords
Funding Information
- Uniwersytet Warszawski (IDUB Excellence Initiative ‐ New Ideas)
This publication has 41 references indexed in Scilit:
- Political Parties and Electoral Clientelism2023
- Patterns of Local Autonomy in Europe2019
- Mayors and Political Parties2017
- Local Government Systems: Grasping the Institutional Environment of Mayors2017
- Do politicians reward core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant programEuropean Journal of Political Economy, 2016
- What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in BrazilJournal of Development Economics, 2016
- Cultural vs. economic legacies of empires: Evidence from the partition of PolandJournal of Comparative Economics, 2015
- Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House electionsJournal of Econometrics, 2008
- Divided Loyalties? Mayors between Party Representation and Local Community Interests2007
- Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competitionPublic Choice, 1987