Modelling the Iranian Petroleum Contract fiscal regime using bargaining game theory to guide contract negotiators
Authors:
- Mehdi KeshavarzMKMehdi Keshavarz
- Hossein IranmaneshHIHossein Iranmanesh
- Reza DehghanRDReza Dehghan
Open Access
- 1 December 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by KEAI Publishing in Petroleum Science
- Vol. 18 (6) , 1887-1898
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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