Incentivos à reeleição afetam a eficiência dos gestores públicos? Uma análise para os municípios brasileiros
Open Access
- 1 September 2023
- journal article
- Published by Universidade de São Paulo. Agência de Bibliotecas e Coleções Digitais in Economia Aplicada
- Vol. 27 (3) , 291-319
Abstract
The article shows how re-election affects the efficiency of education management. The treatment group selected municipalities with mayors running for re-election and compared them with two control groups: 1) municipalities with first-term mayors not running for re-election, and 2) municipalities with mayors already in their second term. In the first, a Propensity Score Weighting was used. In the second, a regression analysis was performed with a variable equal to 1 for the treatment and 0 for the control. The results indicated that first-term mayors running for re-election are less inefficient than those in their second term.Keywords
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