Fiscal Structure and the Post‐Proposition 13 Fiscal Regime in California's Cities
- 24 November 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Public Budgeting & Finance
- Vol. 24 (4) , 51-72
Abstract
Two and a half decades after the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, California state and local governments continue to feel the intended and unintended effects of tax and expenditure limitations. While considerable time has passed since voters enacted Proposition 13, the effects of the property tax revolt continue to be dramatic. This article examines the fiscal structure of California's city governments from 1972 to 2002. The analysis reveals that California's cities have become less reliant upon property tax revenues and more reliant upon charges and fees, and have not increased reliance upon sales tax revenues as much as expected.Keywords
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