Verification of a Cryptographic Primitive
Top Cited Papers
Open Access
- 16 April 2015
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems
- Vol. 37 (2) , 1-31
Abstract
This article presents a full formal machine-checked verification of a C program: the OpenSSL implementation of SHA-256. This is an interactive proof of functional correctness in the Coq proof assistant, using the Verifiable C program logic. Verifiable C is a separation logic for the C language, proved sound with respect to the operational semantics for C, connected to the CompCert verified optimizing C compiler.Keywords
Funding Information
- DARPA (FA8750-12-2-0293)
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