The Case for Quantum Key Distribution
Preprint
Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises secure key agreement by using quantum mechanical systems. We argue that QKD will be an important part of future cryptographic infrastructures. It can provide long-term confidentiality for encrypted information without reliance on computational assumptions. Although QKD still requires authentication to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, it can make use of either information-theoretically secure symmetric key authentication or computationally secure public key authentication: even when using public key authentication, we argue that QKD still offers stronger security than classical key agreement.Keywords
All Related Versions
- Version 1, 2009-02-17, ArXiv
- Version 2, 2009-12-02, ArXiv
- Published version: , 283.
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