To pay or to apologize? On the psychology of dealing with unfair offers in a dictator game
Author:
- David De CremerDCDavid De Cremer
- 1 December 2010
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 31 (6) , 843-848
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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