Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference
Author:
- 26 August 2009
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 24 (4) , 445-466
Abstract
It is argued on a variety of grounds that recent results in ‘experimental philosophy of language’, which appear to show that there are significant cross‐cultural differences in intuitions about the reference of proper names, do not pose a threat to a more traditional mode of philosophizing about reference. Some of these same grounds justify a complaint about experimental philosophy as a whole.Keywords
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