Effectiveness and detection of denial-of-service attacks in tor
Open Access
- 30 November 2012
- journal article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
- Vol. 15 (3) , 1-25
Abstract
Tor is one of the more popular systems for anonymizing near-real-time communications on the Internet. Borisov et al. [2007] proposed a denial-of-service-based attack on Tor (and related systems) that significantly increases the probability of compromising the anonymity provided. In this article, we analyze the effectiveness of the attack using both an analytic model and simulation. We also describe two algorithms for detecting such attacks, one deterministic and proved correct, the other probabilistic and verified in simulation.Keywords
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