Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms
Authors:
- 1 April 2006
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of Finance
- Vol. 12 (3) , 265-282
Abstract
This paper reports on empirical investigations into the relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure of firms, using a sample of 139 listed Italian companies. Ownership structure in Italy is highly concentrated and hence the relevant agency problem to analyse seems to be the one that arises from the conflicting interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders. This paper therefore attempts to test the rent extraction hypothesis by relating the firm’s dividend payout ratio to various ownership variables, which measure the degree of concentration in terms of the voting rights of large shareholders. The hypothesis that other non-controlling large shareholders may have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder is also tested. The results of the empirical analysis reveal that firms make lower dividend payouts as the voting rights of the largest shareholder increase. Results also suggest that the presence of agreements among large shareholders might explain the limited monitoring power of other ‘strong’ non-controlling shareholders.Keywords
This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
- Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in GermanyEuropean Economic Review, 2003
- The ultimate ownership of Western European corporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 2002
- Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay?Journal of Financial Economics, 2001
- Dividends and ExpropriationAmerican Economic Review, 2001
- TunnelingAmerican Economic Review, 2000
- Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the WorldThe Journal of Finance, 2000
- The separation of ownership and control in East Asian CorporationsJournal of Financial Economics, 2000
- One share-one vote and the market for corporate controlJournal of Financial Economics, 1988
- Sample Selection Bias as a Specification ErrorEconometrica, 1979
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureJournal of Financial Economics, 1976