Asymmetric networks, clientelism and their impacts: households' access to workfare employment in rural India
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Abstract
In this paper we explore two intertwined issues. First, using primary data we examine the impact of asymmetric networks, built on rich relational information on several spheres of living, on access to workfare employment in rural India. We find that unidirectional relations, as opposed to reciprocal relations, and the concentration of such unidirectional relations increase access to workfare jobs. Further in-depth exploration provides evidence that patron-client relations are responsible for this differential access to such employment for rural households. Complementary to our empirical exercises, we construct and analyse a game-theoretical model supporting our findings.Keywords
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