Democratic accountability and the exchange-rate policy of the euro area1
Author:
- 31 October 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 14 (5) , 774-799
Abstract
This article examines the consequences of the political ‘incompleteness’ of the monetary union for the democratic accountability of its external monetary policy, comparing the euro area to the United States. In most countries, exchange-rate policymaking is substantially delegated to the finance ministry and central bank; oversight by other domestic actors is relatively weak. While this is true of the United States, the role of the Congress provides the possibility for ‘democratic override’ when policy diverges substantially from the preferences of a broad set of private sector interests. Europe's monetary union, by contrast, lacks such a mechanism; no institution can provide an effective check on the policies pursued by the core actors, the ECB and Eurogroup. A comparison of the postures of the United States and euro area toward Chinese exchange rate policy suggests that these institutional differences affect policy outcomes.Keywords
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