CEO compensation and banks’ risk-taking during pre and post financial crisis periods
Authors:
- Syed Zulfiqar Ali ShahSSSyed Zulfiqar Ali Shah
- Saeed AkbarSaeed Akbar
- Jia LiuJLJia Liu
- Ziyu LiuZLZiyu Liu
- Sichen CaoSCSichen Cao
- 1 December 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Research in International Business and Finance
- Vol. 42, 1489-1503
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 36 references indexed in Scilit:
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