Conducting truthful surveys, cheaply
Open Access
- 4 June 2012
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 826-843
Abstract
We consider the problem of conducting a survey with the goal of obtaining an unbiased estimator of some population statistic when individuals have unknown costs (drawn from a known prior) for participating in the survey. Individuals must be compensated for their participation and are strategic agents, and so the payment scheme must incentivize truthful behavior. We derive optimal truthful mechanisms for this problem for the two goals of minimizing the variance of the estimator given a fixed budget, and minimizing the expected cost of the survey given a fixed variance goal.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Take It or Leave It: Running a Survey When Privacy Comes at a CostLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012
- Selling privacy at auction2011
- Optimal Auction DesignMathematics of Operations Research, 1981
- Admissibility and Bayes Estimation in Sampling Finite Populations. IThe Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 1965
- Randomized Response: A Survey Technique for Eliminating Evasive Answer BiasJournal of the American Statistical Association, 1965
- A Generalization of Sampling Without Replacement from a Finite UniverseJournal of the American Statistical Association, 1952