Representing, Running, and Revising Mental Models: A Computational Model
Authors:
Open Access
- 27 December 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 42 (4) , 1110-1145
Abstract
People use commonsense science knowledge to flexibly explain, predict, and manipulate the world around them, yet we lack computational models of how this commonsense science knowledge is represented, acquired, utilized, and revised. This is an important challenge for cognitive science: Building higher order computational models in this area will help characterize one of the hallmarks of human reasoning, and it will allow us to build more robust reasoning systems. This paper presents a novel assembled coherence (AC) theory of human conceptual change, whereby people revise beliefs and mental models by constructing and evaluating explanations using fragmentary, globally inconsistent knowledge. We implement AC theory with Timber, a computational model of conceptual change that revises its beliefs and generates human‐like explanations in commonsense science. Timber represents domain knowledge using predicate calculus and qualitative model fragments, and uses an abductive model formulation algorithm to construct competing explanations for phenomena. Timber then (a) scores competing explanations with respect to previously accepted beliefs, using a cost function based on simplicity and credibility, (b) identifies a low‐cost, preferred explanation and accepts its constituent beliefs, and then (c) greedily alters previous explanation preferences to reduce global cost and thereby revise beliefs. Consistency is a soft constraint in Timber; it is biased to select explanations that share consistent beliefs, assumptions, and causal structure with its other, preferred explanations. In this paper, we use Timber to simulate the belief changes of students during clinical interviews about how the seasons change. We show that Timber produces and revises a sequence of explanations similar to those of the students, which supports the psychological plausibility of AC theory.Keywords
Funding Information
- Northwestern University
- Office of Naval Research
This publication has 45 references indexed in Scilit:
- Some assembly required: How scientific explanations are constructed during clinical interviewsJournal of Research in Science Teaching, 2011
- Big Ideas: A review of astronomy education research 1974–2008International Journal of Science Education, 2009
- Resubsumption: A Possible Mechanism for Conceptual Change and Belief RevisionEducational Psychologist, 2009
- What changes in conceptual change?International Journal of Science Education, 1998
- Analogical Reasoning and Conceptual Change: A Case Study of Johannes KeplerJournal of the Learning Sciences, 1997
- MAC/FAC: A Model of Similarity‐Based RetrievalCognitive Science, 1995
- Eliciting Self‐Explanations Improves UnderstandingCognitive Science, 1994
- Misconceptions Reconceived: A Constructivist Analysis of Knowledge in TransitionJournal of the Learning Sciences, 1994
- Mental Models of the Day/Night CycleCognitive Science, 1994
- Force concept inventoryThe Physics Teacher, 1992