A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States*
- 1 December 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 108 (4) , 571-585
Abstract
The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition uses models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition uses political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium due to changes in the costs and benefits of buying votes. Although they provide considerable insight, these traditions have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study the choice between conflict and democracy. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
- Economic Backwardness in Political PerspectiveAmerican Political Science Review, 2006
- What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?Journal of Peace Research, 2004
- Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil WarAmerican Political Science Review, 2003
- Warlord CompetitionJournal of Peace Research, 2002
- How Much War Will we see?Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2002
- Battlefields and marketplacesDefence and Peace Economics, 2002
- Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical PerspectiveThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000
- Contest success functionsEconomic Theory, 1996
- Contest success functionsEconomic Theory, 1996
- ON THE EFFICIENT ORGANIZATION OF TRIALSKyklos, 1975