Public Choice Theory
Author:
- 4 December 2017
- book chapter
- Published by Wiley
- p. 1-14
Abstract
Since World War II, a large literature has arisen that uses the methodology of economics to examine the behavior of governments and the actors in them. Some contributors to this literature refer to their research as “public choice,” some as “social choice,” and still others as “political economy.” This entry adopts a broad perspective on the field and treats contributions under all three headings simply aspublic choice. The entry discusses several of the early “classics” in the field, and some of the more important recent contributions to public choice are also described. Two important critiques of the public choice approach are reviewed, and the entry closes with brief conclusions.Keywords
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