Moving Target Defense for Hardening the Security of the Power System State Estimation
Authors:
Open Access
- 3 November 2014
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 59-68
Abstract
State estimation plays a critically important role in ensuring the secure and reliable operation of the electric grid. Recent works have shown that the state estimation process is vulnerable to stealthy attacks where an adversary can alter certain measurements to corrupt the solution of the process, but evade the existing bad data detection algorithms and remain invisible to the system operator. Since the state estimation result is used to compute optimal power flow and perform contingency analysis, incorrect estimation can undermine economic and secure system operation. However, an adversary needs sufficient resources as well as necessary knowledge to achieve a desired attack outcome. The knowledge that is required to launch an attack mainly includes the measurements considered in state estimation, the connectivity among the buses, and the power line admittances. Uncertainty in information limits the potential attack space for an attacker. This advantage of uncertainty enables us to apply moving target defense (MTD) strategies for developing a proactive defense mechanism for state estimation. In this paper, we propose an MTD mechanism for securing state estimation, which has several characteristics: (i) increase the knowledge uncertainty for attackers, (ii) reduce the window of attack opportunity, and (iii) increase the attack cost. In this mechanism, we apply controlled randomization on the power grid system properties, mainly on the set of measurements that are considered in state estimation, and the topology, especially the line admittances. We thoroughly analyze the performance of the proposed mechanism on the standard IEEE 14- and 30-bus test systems.Keywords
Funding Information
- Division of Computer and Network Systems (CNS-1352238)
This publication has 24 references indexed in Scilit:
- A formal model for verifying the impact of stealthy attacks on optimal power flow in power grids2014
- A formal model for verifying stealthy attacks on state estimation in power grids2013
- Malicious data detection in state estimation leveraging system losses & estimation of perturbed parameters2013
- Efficient Random Route Mutation considering flow and network constraints2013
- Topology Perturbation for Detecting Malicious Data Injection2012
- False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power gridsACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 2011
- Strategic Protection Against Data Injection Attacks on Power GridsIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2011
- Z3: An Efficient SMT Solver2008
- Defending against hitlist worms using network address space randomizationComputer Networks, 2007
- Power generation operation and control — 2nd editionFuel and Energy Abstracts, 1996