International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies
Author:
- Gorazd RuseskiGRGorazd Ruseski
- 1 July 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 36 (1) , 70-88
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
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