Stability of international environmental agreements under isoelastic utility
Author:
- 1 February 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Resource and Energy Economics
- Vol. 59
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
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