Monitoring and Employee Shirking: Evidence from MLB Umpires
Author:
- John Charles BradburyJBJohn Charles Bradbury
- 1 January 2017
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
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