Multiple birds with one stone: Beating 1/2 for EFX and GMMS via envy cycle elimination
Authors:
- Georgios AmanatidisGAGeorgios Amanatidis
- Evangelos MarkakisEMEvangelos Markakis
- Apostolos NtokosANApostolos Ntokos
- 1 November 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 841, 94-109
Abstract
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Funding Information
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
- European Research Council
- European Cooperation in Science and Technology
- Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca
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- Equity, envy, and efficiencyJournal of Economic Theory, 1974