Kane, Luck, and the significance of free will
- 1 May 1999
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Explorations
- Vol. 2 (2) , 96-104
Abstract
This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the “Intelligibility” and “Existence” questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls “The Significance Question” about free will: “Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom ‘worth wanting’... and, if so, why?” A desire for “objective worth” has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire.Keywords
This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Significance of Free Will.The Journal of Philosophy, 1998
- Soft Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style ScenariosPhilosophical Topics, 1996
- Why Agent Causation?Philosophical Topics, 1996