Selecting efficient correlated equilibria through distributed learning
- 1 November 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 106, 114-133
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Office of Naval Research (N00014-17-1-2060)
- National Science Foundation (ECCS-1638214)
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