Abstract
The transition in Bangladesh following the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 and the installation of an interim government led by Muhammad Yunus catalysed an ambitious set of reforms targeting state institutions, with particular attention to the judiciary. This article examines the judicial reform agenda during the interim period (August 2024–August 2025), situating reform initiatives within theories of institutional change and elite bargaining. Using qualitative methods — document analysis, elite interviews reported in public sources, and thematic content analysis of policy documents and press coverage — the study traces the origins, designs, and early implementation of major reform measures: the Judicial Reform Roadmap announced by the Supreme Court leadership, legislative and prosecutorial changes linked to transitional justice claims, and administrative reforms aimed at reducing case backlogs and improving transparency. The findings show a tension between reformist intent (independence, digitalisation, access to justice) and politically charged measures (party bans, expanded prosecutorial mandates) that risk instrumentalising the legal system for transitional politics. The article argues that successful, sustainable judicial reform will require institutional safeguards — transparent appointment mechanisms, procedural protections, incremental depoliticisation, and engagement with professional and civil society actors. Policy recommendations stress procedural insulation, judicial capacity-building, and international technical support. The study contributes an empirically grounded, theory-informed account of judicial reform under political transition. Keywords: judicial reform, Bangladesh, interim government, institutional change, judicial independence, transitional justice