Mechanisms for Efficient Voting with Private Information about Preferences
Authors:
- 12 March 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 122 (563) , 1010-1041
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This publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
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