The response to incentives and contractual efficiency: Evidence from a field experiment
Authors:
- Harry J. PaarschHPHarry J. Paarsch
- Bruce S. ShearerBSBruce S. Shearer
- 1 July 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 53 (5) , 481-494
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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