RETHINKING DYNAMIC CAPITAL STRUCTURE MODELS WITH ROLL‐OVER DEBT
- 19 June 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Finance
- Vol. 24 (1) , 66-96
Abstract
Dynamic capital structure models with roll‐over debt rely on widely accepted arguments that have never been formalized. This paper clarifies the literature and provides a rigorous formulation of the equity holders’ decision problem within a game theory framework. We spell out the linkage between default policies in a rational expectations equilibrium and optimal stopping theory. We prove that there exists a unique equilibrium in constant barrier strategies, which coincides with that derived in the literature. Furthermore, that equilibrium is the unique equilibrium when the firm loses all its value at default time. Whether the result holds when there is a recovery at default remains a conjecture.Keywords
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