EXCESS‐ENTRY THEOREM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF LICENSING*
Authors:
- 13 October 2008
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Manchester School
- Vol. 76 (6) , 675-689
Abstract
We show that, in the presence of technology licensing, entry in an industry with Cournot competition may lead to a socially insufficient, number of firms. Insufficient entry occurs if the own marginal cost of the entrant is sufficiently high. Hence, the justification for anticompetitive entry regulation due to the standard excess‐entry result may not be justified in the presence of licensing. However, if the own marginal cost of the entrant is very low, licensing may create excessive entry for those entry costs where entry does not occur without licensing; thus licensing reduces social welfare though it increases competition.Keywords
This publication has 31 references indexed in Scilit:
- Free entry and social efficiency under vertical oligopolyThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2007
- LICENSING CONTRACT IN A STACKELBERG MODEL*The Manchester School, 2005
- Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries*Economic Record, 2005
- Determinants of international activity: evidence from the chemical processing industryResearch Policy, 2004
- Simultaneous entry and welfareEuropean Economic Review, 2004
- Welfare reducing licensingGames and Economic Behavior, 2002
- Pricing a Network Good To Deter EntryThe Journal of Industrial Economics, 2000
- Patents, licensing, and market structure in the chemical industryResearch Policy, 1997
- Oligopolistic Competition and the Optimal Provision of ProductsEconometrica, 1995
- Cross-Licensing of Competing Patents as a Facilitating DeviceCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 1994