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The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
Home
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The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
Authors:
KK
Kai A. Konrad
Kai A. Konrad
WL
Wolfgang Leininger
Wolfgang Leininger
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1 January 2007
preprint
Published by
RePEc
in
RePEc
Abstract
We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts 'early' and a group of players who choose 'late'. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses 'late', whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. © 2007 Springer-Verlag.
Keywords
PLAYERS WHO
PAY AUCTION
LOWEST COST
WHO CHOOSE
CHOICE
PAYOFF
EFFORT
All Related Versions
Version 1, 2007-01-01, RePEc
Version 1, 2005-01-01, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)
Version 1, 2006-01-01, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)
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