The Effect of False-name Bids in First Price Auctions
- 1 January 2011
- journal article
- Published by Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence in Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 26 (1) , 199-207
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 9 references indexed in Scilit:
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