Can Physicalism Be Non‐Reductive?
Author:
- 20 November 2008
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 3 (6) , 1281-1296
Abstract
Can physicalism (or materialism) be non‐reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non‐reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non‐reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non‐reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.Keywords
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