PhantomChannel: A Parasitic Covert Channel via a Parsing-Boundary Blind Spot in BLE Link-Layer Traffic
Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3999-4013
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- National Key Research and Development Program of China中国国家重点研发计划 (2023YFC3321402)
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