The Concept of Special Custom in International Law
Author:
- Anthony A. D’aMatoADAnthony A. D’aMato
- 1 April 1969
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Journal of International Law
- Vol. 63 (2) , 211-223
Abstract
There are regrettably few cases in international law that go into the question of the proof necessary to establish a customary rule binding upon the defendant state. And from those few cases, notably those decided by the World Court, most writers have drawn pessimistic conclusions as to the proof needed for custom because of the Court’s apparent insistence, in Professor Palk’s words, upon “some tangible evidence of consent on the part of the state that is bound.” A showing of consent is a very difficult proposition. Many legal disputes arise precisely because neither side has previously consented to the same rule. As Lauterpacht argued, to say that prior consent must be shown in order to reach a legal conclusion in any given international dispute is tantamount to rejecting the possibility of the existence of the vast majority of the rules of international law. But then, how can we explain the World Court’s reasoning in the Asylum, Right of Passage, and Fisheries Cases in which the element of consent on the part of the defendant states seemed to play such a vital role in the Court’s reasoning concerning the existence of binding rules of law?Keywords
This publication has 1 reference indexed in Scilit:
- The Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case and Proof of Customary International LawAmerican Journal of International Law, 1951