Idiosyncratic risk, risk-taking incentives and the relation between managerial ownership and firm value
Authors:
- Chris FlorackisCFChris Florackis
- Angelos KanasAKAngelos Kanas
- Alexandros KostakisAKAlexandros Kostakis
- Sushil SainaniSSSushil Sainani
- 1 June 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 283 (2) , 748-766
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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