Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy
- 16 March 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 43 (8) , 3386-3403
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 124 references indexed in Scilit:
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