Discretion by the rules: European state aid policy and the 1999 Procedural Regulation
- 1 October 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 17 (7) , 954-970
Abstract
The contribution assesses the effectiveness of the Procedural Regulation on the Commission's ability to control state aid. Using a principal–agent framework infused with insight from sociological institutionalism and data during the period 1992–2004, the study finds the Regulation strengthened the Commission's hand, reducing state aid. The study has implications for the single market and the literatures of international delegation and bureaucratic control.Keywords
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