Why do contracts between airlines and airports fail?
Authors:
- Cristina BarbotCBCristina Barbot
- Tiziana D'AlfonsoTDTiziana D'Alfonso
- 1 September 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Transportation Economics
- Vol. 45, 34-41
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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