The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings
Author:
- Jonathan M. KarpoffJKJonathan M. Karpoff
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Researchers and investors disagree over the extent to which shareholder activism facilitates improvements in target firms' values, earnings, operations, and govKeywords
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