Taming the Giant Corporation? Some Cautionary Remarks on the Deterrability of Corporate Crime
Author:
- Charles A. MooreCMCharles A. Moore
- 1 July 1987
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Crime & Delinquency
- Vol. 33 (3) , 379-402
Abstract
Conventional wisdom accords deterrence a prominent role in the control of corporate crime. It is argued that current confidence in a deterrence strategy is unfounded, first, because it is based on an unrealistic view of corporate decision making and, second, because it makes an overly optimistic appraisal of our legal system's capacity to control corporate conduct through punitive means. It is further argued that efforts to increase the sanctions imposed on corporate offenders may produce unintended consequences that would increase, rather than lessen, the victimization resulting from corporate wrongdoing. “Penetrating” legal controls, such as incapacitation and rehabilitation, are proposed as preferable alternatives.Keywords
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