Pleasure and the Good Life
Author:
Top Cited Papers
- 25 March 2004
- book
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Abstract
Hedonism is the view that the Good Life is the pleasant life. The central aim of this book is to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. The forms defended understand pleasure as intrinsic attitudinal pleasure. Rejects all forms of sensory hedonism. Defends preferred forms of hedonism against a barrage of classic objections derived from Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Moore, Ross, Rawls, and many others. Compares the author's forms of hedonism to the hedonistic views of Aristippus, Epicurus, Bentham, and Mill. Some views in value theory are typically thought to be anti‐hedonistic. Shows that some of these views are equivalent to forms of hedonism. Also defends the claim that all the allegedly hedonistic theories discussed in the book are properly classified as forms of ‘hedonism’. Near the end of the book, the author presents his vision of the Good Life and mentions some remaining problems.Keywords
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