As the region with the most serious air pollution in China, Hebei Province, which is close to Beijing, is facing stringent environmental regulation. In face of the continuous pressure from the central government, most areas in Hebei Province, represented by Handan City, have carried out high-intensity campaign-style environmental governance. However, Chengde City, which is also in Hebei Province, adopted different strategies. In order to explain the differences, this paper constructs a resource mobilization framework for the campaign-style governance, namely “control-incentive-negotiation” framework. The framework is tested by taking the air pollution regulation in Handan and Chengde in 2017-2018 as examples. The study found that despite the unprecedentedly strengthened authority of the central government since the 18th CCP National Congress, under the combined effect of theater politics, differentiated incentives and implicit negotiation, if a region faces too many political tasks, the local government will choose the operations and policies that are the most beneficial for itself. The research results is helpful to understand the campaign-style environmental governance in China, as well as the vertical intergovernmental relations.