CEO Pay-for-Complexity and the Risk of Managerial Diversion from Multinational Diversification
Preprint
- 31 August 2012
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Prior studies find that CEOs receive higher pay if the enterprise is more complex because more complex enterprises are, in theory, matched with the managerial skills of higher-ability CEOs. While multinational diversification is typically a characteristic of enterprise complexity, we argue that multinational diversification also introduces a risk that executives will divert an enterprise’s resources to obtain private benefits. We first establish that CEO pay is, on average, increasing in the extent of multinational diversification, consistent with intuition that more complex enterprises are matched to higher‐ability CEOs. We then demonstrate that the CEO pay‐for‐complexity premium is lower if the multinational diversification reflects a relatively high risk of managerial diversion. For sufficiently high levels of multinational diversification accompanied by a high risk of managerial diversion, we find that CEOs receive a relative reduction in pay rather than a pay premium for multinational diversification. We also find evidence that this pay effect occurs in part through adjustments to a CEO’s pay‐for‐performance sensitivity.Keywords
This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
- Transient Institutional Ownership and CEO ContractingThe Accounting Review, 2009
- What Matters in Corporate Governance?The Review of Financial Studies, 2008
- Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentivesJournal of Financial Economics, 2006
- Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systemsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 2004
- Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm PoliciesThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003
- Global Diversification, Industrial Diversification, and Firm ValueThe Journal of Finance, 2002
- The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United KingdomThe Economic Journal, 2000
- The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levelsJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1999
- CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluationJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1996
- Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application to the Demand for Durable GoodsEconometrica, 1971